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An Equitable Approach to Products
Liability Statutes of Repose
INTRODUCTION

Suppose a consumer purchased a control valve for his liquified
petroleum gas water heater in 1957. The manufacturer knew at the
time of manufacture and sale that the control valve was defective.
Even after the defect caused numerous deaths and serious injuries,
the manufacturer did not make reasonable and good faith efforts to
recall the product or warn unsuspecting consumers.' In fact, the
manufacturer took active steps to conceal the defects and dangers the
control valve presented. The consumer was severely burned following
a gas leak caused by the defective control valve in 1993. Under a
plain reading of most products liability statutes of repose, the consumer would be prevented from bringing an action against the man2

ufacturer.
Statutes of repose terminate any right of action after a specified

time following manufacture or first sale of the product, regardless of
3
whether or not there has yet been an injury. In general, these
enactments were the legislative response to the perceived sky-rocketing
1. For similar facts, see Wilson v. Robertshaw Controls Co., No. S 83-312
(N.D. Ind. June 28, 1984) (denying defendant's summary judgment motion), mot.
denied, 600 F. Supp. 671 (N.D. Ind. 1985) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss).
See also Young v. Robertshaw Controls Co., 481 N.Y.S.2d 891 (N.Y. App. Div.
1984); Cogswell v. Robertshaw Controls Co., 274 N.W.2d 647 (Wis. 1979).
2. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 33-1-1.5-5 (West Supp. 1992). The Indiana
statute applies to any products liability action regardless of whether the theory of
recovery is based on negligence or strict products liability. Id. "[A] product liability
action must be commenced within two (2) years after the cause of action accrues or
within ten (10) years after the delivery of the product to the initial user or consumer."
Id.; cf. 735 ILCS 5/13-213(b) (1992). The Illinois statute of repose, which applies
only to strict products liability, states:
No product liability action based on the doctrine of strict liability in tort
shall be commenced except within the applicable limitations period and, in
any event, within 12 years from the date of first sale, . . . or 10 years from
the date of first sale . . . to its initial user . . . whichever period expires
earlier. ...
Id.
3. Hanson v. Williams County, 389 N.W.2d 319, 321 (N.D. 1986) (distinguishing statutes of limitation and statutes of repose); Francis E. McGovern, The Variety,
Policy and Constitutionality of Product Liability Statutes of Repose, 30 AM. U. L.
REV. 579, 584-86 (1981) (describing the various definitions of "statutes of repose").
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cost of products liability insurance. 4 Although the result is manifestly
unfair, the consumer's claim in the introductory example would be
absolutely barred because the control valve exceeded the statutory
repose period. His claim would have been extinguished prior to his
injury. In short, the consumer would be ,completely deprived of any

legal recourse for his injuries resulting from the manufacturer's
wrongs merely because he was injured by an older product.'
Courts have long recognized the applicability of equitable prin-

ciples to statutes of limitations where the defendant induced the

plaintiff to forego suit or concealed a cause of action from the
plaintiff until the limitations period had run.6 Thus, courts are willing
to equitably toll statutes of limitations to allow the plaintiff's cause
of action. However, courts have not been so willing to apply the
equitable principles of estoppel to the fairly recent legislative creation
of statutes of repose. 7 When analyzing the applicability of equitable
estoppel to statutes of repose, there are two distinct situations which
must be addressed.
In the first situation, the injury occurs within the repose period,
but because of the wrongful conduct of the defendant, the plaintiff

forgoes the bringing of suit until after the repose period has expired.
In these situations, the courts are generally inclined to allow the
application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel to prevent the
defendant from asserting the statute of repose as a defense.'

In the second situation, the injury occurs after the repose period
has ended, but the manufacturer previously misrepresented its product
or fraudulently concealed from the consumer its knowledge of the
unreasonably dangerous and defective condition of its product to the

detriment of the consumer. In this second situation, the courts have
been disinclined to bend the rigid rule of repose on account of

4. Model Unif. Prod. Liab. Act § 110(B)(1), 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,733
(1979) ("Perhaps more significant than any other single factor alleged to be the cause
of the nationwide product liability insurance problem are the rules governing the
responsibility of product sellers for older products.").
5. Raithaus v. Saab-Scandia of Am., Inc., 784 P.2d 1158, 1160-61 (Utah
1989). In differentiating between statutes of limitation and repose, the court stated:
"Statutes of repose ...

focus on the age of a product rather than on the [manufac-

turer's] conduct." Id. (citing Thomas A. Dickson, The Statute of Limitations in
North Dakota's Product Liability Act: An Exercise in Futility?, 59 N.D. L. REV.
551, 556-57 (1983)).

6. See, e.g., Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. 231, 234-35 (1959);
Union Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Mowry, 96 U.S. 544, 547-48 (1877); Anane v. Pettibone
Corp., 560 N.E.2d 1088, 1092 (I11.App. Ct. 1990).
7. See discussion infra part III.A-B.
8. See infra notes 63, 64 and accompanying text.
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equitable considerations. 9 This unwillingness to apply equitable principles to statutes of repose is partly because of deference to the
legislative intent to extinguish causes of action which arise after a
given number of years 10 and partly because of the argument that since
the statutes mark the absolute limit of manufacturer liability, any
right the consumer had to redress is extinguished once the repose
period has expired."
The particular problem addressed in this comment is the applicability of equitable principles to products liability statutes of repose
in the second situation, when the injury caused by a defective product
occurs after the repose period has ended and it is alleged that the
manufacturer fraudulently concealed from the consumer its knowledge
of the defect.' 2 Part I examines the distinction between statutes of
limitations and statutes of repose, the history of strict products
liability, and the rationale for the enactment of products liability
statutes of repose. Part II discusses the doctrine of equitable estoppel
and its application. Part III analyzes the current status of the law,
particularly the different treatment given to situation one cases and
situation two cases by the courts. After balancing the interests of the
manufacturers and injured consumers in light of the present case law
in part IV, the conclusion reached is that the principles of equitable
estoppel should be applied to bar the manufacturer from asserting
the statute of repose as a defense where the manufacturer intentionally
withheld its knowledge of the unreasonably dangerous defects of its
product from the consumer.
I.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

A. . STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS VS. STATUTES OF REPOSE

As a preliminary matter, it is necessary to distinguish between
the terms "statutes of limitations" and "statutes of repose." Often
9. See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
10. See infra note 70 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 96-92 and accompanying text.
12. This comment assumes a manufacturer has a duty to warn consumers of
unreasonably dangerous and defective attributes of products and a duty to recall
those products. See generally Young v. Robertshaw Controls Co., 481 N.Y.S.2d 891,
894 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (discussing propane water heater control manufacturer's
duty to warn); Blossman Gas Co. v. Williams, 375 S.E.2d 117, 119-120 (Ga. App.
Ct. 1988) (discussing propane gas supplier's voluntarily assumed duty to recall).
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courts are inconsistent with their use of these terms. 3 A statute of
limitations cuts off the plaintiff's right to bring suit after a given
period of time after the cause of action has accrued. A cause of action
accrues at the time of the injury or when the plaintiff, through the
exercise of due diligence, should have discovered the injury. 14 Such
statutes require that a suit be filed within a specified period of time
after a legal right has been violated or the remedy for the wrong is
deemed waived.' 5
Most products liability statutes of repose, in contrast, begin to
run at the date of manufacture or first sale to a consumer and
extinguish a cause of action after a set number of years.' 6 Since these
13. Raithaus v. Saab-Scandia of Am., Inc., 784 P.2d 1158, 1161 (Utah 1989).
The term "statute of repose" does have several different meanings. McGovern, supra
note 3, at 582-87. McGovern cites five distinct definitions of the term "statute of
repose" which are in use:
1) A general definition which treats statutes of limitations and repose as identical.
Any legislative enactments which prescribe the period of time in which an action may
be brought. Id. at 582.
2) An even more general term which encompasses various statutes which prescribe
time periods, such as statutes of limitations, escheats, and adverse possession. Id. at
583.
3) That portion of a statute of limitations which begins to run at the time of discovery
of the injury or cause of action. Id.
4) A statute of repose is distinct from a statute of limitations because it begins to
run at a time unrelated to the traditional accrual of the cause of action. Id. at 58486.
5) A useful safe life provision which provides that a defendant may be relieved of
liability upon a showing that the allegedly unsafe product has been used beyond its
useful safe life. Id. at 586.
14. The Illinois products liability statute of limitations provides that if the
injury occurs within the repose period,
the plaintiff may bring an action within 2 years after the date on which the
claimant knew, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have
known, of the existence of the personal injury, death or property damage,
but in no event shall such action be brought more than 8 years after the
date on which such personal injury, death or property damage occurred.
735 ILCS 5/13-213(d) (1992).
15. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 672 (Utah 1985).
16. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-502(c) (Supp. 1992) (products liability action
must be brought within 10 years after date of first use by initial consumer); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-551 (1992) (no action may be commenced if cause of action
accrues more than 12 years after product was first sold for use); GA. CODE ANN. §
51-1-11(b)(2) (Michie Supp. 1992) (no action shall be brought after 10 years from
date of first sale for use); 735 ILCS 5/13-213(b) (1992) (no action shall be commenced
after 10 years from date of first sale or 12 years from date of first sale to initial
user, whichever period expires earlier); IND. CODE ANN. § 33-1-1.5-5 (West Supp.
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statutes begin to run from a date unrelated to the date of injury, they
are not designed to allow a reasonable time for the filing of an action
once it arises. 17 In fact, as in the introductory example, a statute of
repose may bar an action if the injury occurred after the repose
period no matter how diligent the injured person is in seeking a
judicial remedy. 18 In order to bring a valid claim against a manufacturer, a claimant must file suit within the applicable statute of
limitations period, but in no event may suit be brought after expiration
of the repose period. 19
1992) (action must be commenced within 10 years after delivery to initial user); NEB.
§ 25-224(2) (1989) (action must be commenced within 10 years after first
sale for use); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-50(6) (Supp. 1992) (no action shall be brought
more than six years after date of initial purchase for use); N.D. CENT. CODE § 2801.1-02(l) (1991) (no action may be maintained unless harm occurred within 10 years
after date of initial purchase for use, or within 11 years of date of manufacture of
product); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.905(1) (1988) (action shall be commenced no later
than eight years after first purchase for use); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-13(b) (1985)
(action shall be commenced within 10 years after date product was first purchased
for use).
Some states have passed "useful safe life" statutes of repose. See infra note 31
and accompanying text.
The wording and applicability of products liability statutes of repose vary. For
example, the Illinois statute only pertains to actions based on strict products liability.
735 ILCS 5/13-213(b) (1992). Other statutes seek to extinguish suits based on either
strict products liability or negligence. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 33-1-1.5-5 (West
Supp. 1992).
17. Berry, 717 P.2d at 672. It is important to note that statutes of repose also
exist relating to other types of liability, including construction liability and medical
malpractice liability. The analysis of these statutes of repose is similar to that given
to products liability statutes of repose.
For a discussion regarding the constitutionality of construction statutes of repose,
see Canton Lutheran Church v. Sovik, Mathre, Sathrum & Quanbeck, 507 F. Supp.
873, 875-79 (S.D. 1981). There is an interesting question as to when the medical
malpractice statute of repose applies rather than the products liability statute of
repose. For instance, cases involving intrauterine devices have applied the products
liability statute of repose. See Givens v. A.H. Robbins Co., 751 F.2d 261 (8th Cir.
1984); MacMillen v. A.H. Robbins Co., 348 N.W.2d 869 (Neb. 1984). Pharmaceutical
drugs have fallen under the products liability statute of repose. See Groth v. Sandoz,
Inc., 601 F. Supp. 453 (D. Neb. 1984). However, an allegedly defective hip prosthesis
was held to be governed by the medical malpractice statute of repose. Elke v. Zimmer
Inc., 596 N.E.2d 661 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992). In Elke, the court held that the four-year
statute of repose in 735 ILCS 5/13-212(a) (1992) applied to all actions brought
against a health care provider, regardless of the plaintiff's asserted theory. Elke, 596
N.E.2d at 662.
18. Berry, 717 P.2d at 672.
19. However, if the claimant was injured nine years after the first sale of the
REV. STAT.

228

B.
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THE HISTORY OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY STATUTES OF REPOSE

The industrialization of the American economy and the growth
of mass production and marketing in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries resulted in widespread injury and death caused by unreasonably dangerous and defective products. 20 Responding to these developments, the courts allowed injured consumers to bring actions against
product manufacturers based on fault (i.e. negligence), 2' and eventually shifted the risk of loss from consumers to manufacturers through
22
the development of strict products liability.
The purpose of strict products liability "is to insure that the costs
of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by the
injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves. 21 3 The
rationale is that the manufacturer stands in the best position to protect
product, and the repose period is 10 years, even if a four-year statute of limitations
is applicable, the claimant must bring his or her claim within one year (before the
end of the repose period). Some states' statutes of repose contain a grace period,
providing that if the claimant is injured in the last two years of the repose period,
the injured party has additional time to bring suit. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 33-1-1.5-5
(West Supp. 1992) (Repose period of 10 years after delivery of the product to the
initial user, but a two-year grace period for claims accruing after eight years.).
The following is the view of most courts regarding the effect of the repose
statutes depending upon when the injury accrues:
Where the injury occurs within the [repose] period, and a claimant commences his or her action after the [repose] period has passed, an action
accrues but is barred. Where the injury occurs outside the [repose] period,
no substantive cause of action ever accrues, and a claimant's actions are
likewise barred.
Gillam v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 489 N.W.2d 289, 291 (Neb. 1992) (citations
omitted).
20. Berry, 717 P.2d at 673; see also Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 464 A.2d
288, 292-94 (N.H. 1983) (discussing the evolution of products liability law).
21. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916).
22. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal.
1963); see also OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 117 (1881). Strict
liability was by no means a "new idea" as Oliver Wendell Holmes noted in 1881
that "the safest way to secure care is to throw the risk upon the person who decides
what precautions shall be taken." Id.
23. Greenman, 377 P.2d at 901; see also Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,
150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944) ("Even if there is no negligence ... public policy
demands that responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the
hazards to life and health inherent in defective products that reach the market.");
William L. Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1119-24
(1960) (discussing the various policy rationale for strict product liability); McGovern,
supra note 3, at 590-91 (same); FRANK J. VANDALL, STRICT LIABILITY: LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 20-22 (1989) (same).
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against the harm and is best able to spread and bear the loss. 24 It is
hoped that the effect of strict products liability is to encourage safer
designs, thereby reducing the
manufacturing practices and product
25
incidence of death and injury.

In an effort to "dampen the rapid escalation of insurance rates"
following an "explosion" in products liability litigation since the
advent of strict products liability, many states adopted products
liability statutes of repose in the late 1970s and early 1980s.26 Gener-

24. See

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 402A cmt. c (1977).

[Tihe seller, by marketing his product for use and consumption, has
undertaken and assumed a special responsibility toward any member of the
consuming public who may be injured by it . . . . [T]he consumer of such
products is entitled to the maximum of protection at the hands of someone,
and the proper persons to afford it are those who market the products.
Id.; see also Escola, 150 P.2d at 441 ("[T]he risk of injury can be insured by the
manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing business.");
Camacho v. Honda Motor Co., 741 P.2d 1240, 1247-48 (Colo. 1987) (en banc) (citing
John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J.
825, 837-38 (1973) (listing the manufacturer's ability to spread the loss as one of the
seven factors used in determining whether a product design is unreasonably dangerous)); Prosser, supra note 23, at 1120 (discussing the risk-spreading rationale).
25. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 673 (Utah 1985); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. c (1977); McGovern, supra note 3, at
590.
26. Thorton v. Mono Mfg. Co., 425 N.E.2d 522, 524 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981);
Raithaus v. Saab-Scandia of Am., fnc., 784 P.2d 1158, 1161 (Utah 1989); Ill. Senate
debate, 80th Gen. Assembly, H. Bill 1333, June 24, 1978 at 58 (One senator called
the proposed statute of repose "a very good start in doing something to get a handle
on the ... sky rocketing insurance rates that have been plaguing the indus-

tries ...

."); INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY, FINAL REPORT

Ch.

VII, at 23 (1977) (discussing a product liability insurance study) [hereinafter INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT]; See generally VANDALL, supra note 23, at 15253; Kenneth S. Abraham, Making Sense of the Liability Insurance Crisis, 48 OHIO
ST. L.J. 399, 405 (1987).
Some have argued that the so-called insurance crisis is a "myth" created by the
insurance companies and product manufacturers. See Jerry J. Phillips, Attacks on
the Legal System: Fallacy of 'Tort Reform' Arguments, TRIAL, Feb. 1992, at 106
("Trends and suspected trends in tort liability were blown out of proportion by the
[insurance] industry to justify its massive rate hikes."); Joan Claybrook, Products
Liability: Serving All Americans, TRIAL, Oct. 1990, at 29 (noting that restrictive tort
legislation has not reduced insurance rates). These assessments are well-founded. One
report maintains that the cost to American businesses for product liability insurance

is under one-half of one percent of retail sales.
LIABILITY: 1991 CALENDAR YEAR EXPERIENCE

NAT'L INS. CONSUMER ORG., PRODUCT

4 (1992).

Similarly, others argue that there has been no products liability litigation
"explosion" in the United States. See Philip 14. Corboy, Corboy Disputes Quayle's
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ally, the legislative intent in enacting these statutes was to provide an
absolute cutoff date for bringing suit.27 The legislatures passed products liability statutes of repose to protect product manufacturers and
insurance companies from what is frequently referred to as the "longtail" liability problem, where manufacturers of defective products
could be held liable many years after the manufacture and sale of a
28
product.

Not all statutes of repose attempt to deal with this long-tail
problem the same way. The Model Uniform Product Liability Act's
statute of repose presumes that a product's "useful safe life" is ten
years.2 9 For example, if a consumer is injured by a product over ten
years old, he has the burden of proving that the product's useful safe
life has not yet expired.30 Although the Model Act's presumption of
a ten-year safe life is rebuttable, the majority of the states' statutes
of repose are absolute in their terms and provide for no rebuttal.'
ABA Arguments About 'Litigation Explosion', Cm. DAILY L. BULL., Aug. 30, 1991,
at 2 (viewing the litigation explosion as a "myth that is especially useful for diverting
attention from genuine problems"); Ralph Nader & Joan Claybrook, Preserving a
Pillar of Our Democracy: Tort System Protects the Injured, TRIAL, Dec. 1991, at 45
(contending that the insurance companies and manufacturers created the myth of a
litigation crisis); Talbot D'Alemberte, Justice for All A Response to the Vice
President, TRIAL, May 1992, at 58 (noting that the courts are not overloaded with
product liability cases, but rather with family law, landlord-tenant, and drug cases).
27. See Beals v. Breeden Bros., 833 P.2d 348, 350 (Or. Ct. App. 1992).
28. Michael M. Martin, A Statute of Repose for Product Liability Claims, 50
FORDHAm L. REV. 745, 746-47 (1982). Some in the general aviation industry, for
example, joke that if the airplane flown by the Wright brothers at Kitty Hawk was
still flying today, Orville and Wilber would continue to be liable for it if statutes of
repose were not enacted. Gregory P. Wells, General Aviation Accident Liability
Standards: Why the Fuss?, 56 J. AIR L. & COM. 895, 895 (1991).
29. Model Unif. Prod. Liab. Act §§ 11O(A)(1), I10(B)(1), 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714,
62,732 (1979).
30. See Hodder v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 426 N.W.2d 826, 830 n.3
(Minn. 1988) (discussing Minnesota's useful safe life provision), cert. denied, 492
U.S. 926 (1989). For a discussion of the useful safe life provisions see Tami J.
Johnson, Note, Limiting Manufacturers' Liability for Aging Products, 39 DRAxE L.
REV. 713 (1989/90).

31. Some states have enacted useful safe life products liability statutes of
repose. See CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-403(3) (West 1989) ("Ten years after a
product is first sold for use or consumption, it shall be rebuttably presumed that the
product was not defective and that the manufacturer or seller thereof was not
negligent and that all warnings and instructions were proper and adequate."); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-577a(c) (West 1991) (10-year presumption); IDAHO CODE § 61403(2) (1990) (10-year presumption); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3303(b)(1) (Supp. 1992)
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However, many consumer products, especially capital goods, are
intended to be used well beyond the legislatively-imposed limit."
3a
Two main rationales are often cited for statutes of repose. First,
difficulty exists in locating reliable evidence and defending claims
many years after the product's manufacture when "evidence has been
3
lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.1 Second, after the passage of a reasonable length of time, manufacturers
liability
should be free from the burdens of disruptive and protracted
35
certainty.
of
degree
and able to plan their affairs with a
Other related rationales for enacting statutes of repose include:
to reduce court congestion;3 6 to avoid the possibility of juries unfairly
imposing current legal and technological standards on products man37
ufactured many years prior to suit; to prevent certain product
manufacturers from being discouraged from producing goods due to
(10-year presumption after time of first delivery); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.310(1)
(Michie/Bobbs-Merill 1992) (presuming product not defective if harm occurs either
more than five years after date of sale to first consumer or more than eight years
after date of manufacture); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.03(1) (West 1988) (providing
for a useful safe life defense "that the injury was sustained following the expiration
of the ordinary useful life of the product"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.72.060(2)
(West 1992) (12-year presumption after time of first delivery).
Tennessee's repose provision is a unique hybrid between statutes which declare
an absolute bar to actions arising after a given number of years and those which
contain useful safe life provisions. It provides that an action must be brought within
10 years from the date on which the product was first purchased for use or
consumption or within one year after the expiration of the anticipated life of the

product, whichever is shorter. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-103(a) (Supp. 1993).
32. One representative in the Illinois General Assembly expressed concern over
the fact that the proposed statute made "no distinction between a football helmet
and a 747 or a Fairchild turbojet. . . ." 80th Gen. Assembly, H. Bill 1333, May 25,
1978, at 123 (statement of Rep. Eugene F. Schlickman).
33. See Johnson v. Star Mach. Co., 530 P.2d 53, 56 (Or. 1974); Beals v.
Breeden Bros., 833 P.2d 348, 350 (Or. Ct. App. 1992); Model Unif. Prod. Liab. Act
§§ I10(A)(I), II0(B)(1), 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,734 (1979).
34. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 349
(1944).
35. Johnson, 530 P.2d at 56; Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 681
(Utah 1985).
36. McGovern, supra note 3, at 588. However, most studies conclude that
current "court congestion" is caused by an overload of asbestos, family law, and
'criminal cases, not product liability cases. Talbot D'Alemberte, Justicefor All, TRIAL,
May 1992, at 58; see supra note 26; see infra note 117.
App. Ct. 1981);
37. See Thorton v. Mono Mfg. Co., 425 N.E.2d 522, 524 (I11.
McGovern, supra note 3, at 589. However, this argument assumes that juries disregard
court instructions and the facts of cases.
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the high cost and unavailability of products liability insurance; 3 and
to promote the public goal of certainty and finality in the administration of commercial transactions by terminating liability at a set time.3

9

The rationale behind statutes of repose have not gone without

criticism or constitutional challenge.4 0 The opponents of these meas-

ures argue that it is not just the manufacturer's case which suffers

with the passage of time, both the plaintiff and the defendant must
find lost evidence and missing witnesses. Furthermore, it is the
plaintiff who ultimately carries the additional burden of proving his

or her claim. 4' Another frequent argument is that these statutes do

38. Thorton, 425 N.E.2d at 524; see supra note 26.
39. See Johnson, 530 P.2d at 56; Sun Valley Water Beds of Utah, Inc. v. Herm
Hughes & Son, Inc., 782 P.2d 188, 189 (Utah 1989); cf. Daily v. New Britain Mach.
Co., 512 A.2d 893 (Conn. 1986). Daily listed as one rationale the need to discourage
the rise of stale claims. Id. at 905. Although the "stale claims" rationale is a reason
for the enactment of statutes of limitations, such is not the case with statutes of
repose. As the Utah Supreme Court in Sun Valley stated, "a claim cannot logically
be 'stale' before it accrues." 782 P.2d at 189.
40. Long before the inception of statutes of repose, the "explosion" of products
liability litigation and the insurance "crisis" of the 1970s, the constitutionality of
such provisions had been questioned. E.g., Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55 (1902).
The Wilson Court stated that a statute which failed to allow a claimant an opportunity
to bring suit would not be a statute of limitations, but rather, "an unlawful attempt
to extinguish rights arbitrarily, whatever might be the purport of its provisions." Id.
at 62. The constitutionality of products liability statutes of repose has been challenged
on the basis of the due process and equal protection clauses as well as "open courts
provisions" of some states' constitutions. For a general discussion on the constitutionality of statutes of repose, see Thomas J. Dennis, Products Liability Statutes of
Repose as Conflicting with State Constitutions: The Plaintiffs are Winning, 26 ARIZ,
L. REV. 363 (1984); McGovern, supra note 3, at 600-20; Laurie T. Shield, Comment,
Product Liability Statutes of Repose: On Denying an Injured Plaintiff His or Her
Day in Court, 9 U. DAYTON L. REV. 503 (1984). For cases dealing with constitutional
challenges to products liability statutes of repose, see Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,
717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985) (involving a wrongful death action for the fatal crash of a
23-year-old plane, in which the Utah Supreme Court struck down the state's product
liability statute of repose as unconstitutional under the state constitution's open court
provision); Thorton, 425 N.E.2d at 525-26 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (upholding the
constitutionality of Illinois' products liability statute of repose under due process
challenge); Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 418 N.E.2d 207 (Ind. 1981) (upholding
statute of repose under the state's open courts provision).
41. Sun Valley, 782 P.2d at 190. In addition, it is the defendant manufacturer
which controls all relevant documents regarding the design, testing, and manufacture
of the product. For a discussion of corporate document destruction, see Richard L.
Whitworth & James L. Gilbert, Punishing Evidence Destruction: Keeping Discovery

Fair and Open, TRIAL, Nov. 1992, at 66.

STATUTES OF REPOSE

1993:2231

42
little to make product liability insurance rates affordable. While the
purpose of strict products liability is to place the loss on the party
best able to avoid and spread the cost of the injury, the effect of
statutes of repose is to place the risk of loss on the injured consumer,
43
It is important to remember that
the party least able to afford it.
relief from frauds when the old
granting
in
"[e]quity had its origin

common law courts were too rigid in their reasoning to grant relief
from grave injustices." 4
II.

THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL

As Justice Black stated, equitable estoppel is a "principle of law,
older than the country itself."145 Equitable estoppel is based on the
facts and circumstances of a particular case, thus, any attempted
definition usually amounts only in a declaration that estoppel should
be applied under the facts of a given case.4 The purpose of equitable
estoppel is to prevent fraud and injustice, 47 and to ensure that "no
man may take advantage of his own wrong." 4 Although equitable
estoppel is based upon preventing fraud, the conduct of the party
claiming the defense of the statute of repose need not have committed
a common law fraud in the strictest sense. 4 9 If applied, the doctrine
of equitable estoppel precludes a litigant from asserting an otherwise

42. Sun Valley, 782 P.2d at 190; see supra note 26; see also Berry, 717 P.2d

at 681-82; Martin, supra note 28, at 745-761.
43. Wells, supra note 28, at 924.
44. Guy v. Schuldt, 138 N.E.2d 891, 896 (Ind. 1956).
45. Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. 231, 234 (1959).
46. See Witchita Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Jones, 130 P.2d 556, 559 (Kan.
1942); Jennings v. Bituminous Casualty Corp., 197 N.E.2d 513, 517 (Il. App. Ct.
1964). See generally 28 AM.

JUR.

2D Estoppel and Waiver § 27 (1964) (discussing

equitable estoppel in general).
47. See Union Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Mowry, 96 U.S. 544, 547-48 (1877).
48. Guy, 138 N.E.2d at 896; see also Glus, 359 U.S. at 232; Insurance Co. v.
Wilkinson, 80 U.S. 222, 233 (1871). The Wilkinson Court stated:
The principle is that where one party has by his representations or his
conduct induced the other party to a transaction to give him an advantage
which it would be against equity and good conscience for him to assert, he
Id.

would not in a court of justice be permitted to avail himself of that
advantage.

49. Marcum v. Richmond Auto Parts Co., 270 N.E.2d 884, 887-88 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1971) (citing Howard v. West Jersey & S.S.R. Co., 141 A. 755, 757 (N.J. Eq.
1928) (holding that parties claiming the defense of statutes of limitations need not
have committed a common law fraud)).
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available claim or defense. 0
The Illinois Supreme Court in Vaughn v. Speaker" reiterated the
six elements of equitable estoppel.5 2 First, as applied to a typical
products liability suit, there must be words or conduct by the manufacturer amounting to a misrepresentation or concealment of material
fact. 3 Second, the manufacturer must have had knowledge at the
time the representations were made that the representations were
untrue.54 Third, the injured claimant must not know the truth regarding the manufacturer's representations at the time the representations
were made or at the time he acted on them." Fourth, the manufacturer
must have intended or reasonably expected that its conduct or representations would be acted upon by the claimant or the public generally;
the conduct and representations must be such as would ordinarily
lead to the complained of results.5 6 Fifth, the claimant must have, in
good faith, reasonably relied upon the misrepresentations to his
detriment. 7 Sixth, the claimant would be prejudiced if the manufacturer is permitted to deny the truth of such representations or conduct.5

50. See Johnson v. Neel, 229 P.2d 939, 944 (Colo. 1951) ("A statute cannot
stand in the way of waiver or equitable estoppel when the facts demand their
application in the interest of justice and right."); City of Chetopa v. Board of
County Comm'rs, 133 P.2d 174, 177 (Kan. 1943) ("Equitable estoppel is a rule of
justice which in its proper field prevails over all other rules .... It may, in proper
cases, operate to cut off a right or privilege conferred by statute or even by the
Constitution."). An oft cited rule of equity is that "[o]ne who is silent when he
ought to speak will not be heard to speak when he ought to be silent." 28 AM. JUR.
2D Estoppel and Waiver § 53, at 666 (1966).
51. 533 N.E.2d 885 (I11.1988).
52. Id. at 890; see also Anane v. Pettibone Corp., 560 N.E.2d 1088, 1092 (I11.
App. Ct. 1990) (applying elements of estoppel to products liability case); 28 AM.
JUR. 2D Estoppel and Waiver § 35, at 641 (1966) (listing the elements of equitable
estoppel).
53. Vaughn, 533 N.E.2d at 890. Such misrepresentation need not be made
directly to the injured party; it can take the form of suppression, concealment or
other failure to disclose material facts when a duty to disclose exists. Id.; see infra
note 129.
54. Vaughn, 533 N.E.2d at 890. Knowledge can be implied. Id. Further,
misrepresentations made with gross negligence can form a basis for equitable estoppel.
Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. The claimant's reliance must be reasonable and not reckless. However,
one guilty of fraudulent misrepresentation cannot assert that the person defrauded
was negligent in failing to discover the truth. Id.
58. Id.
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III.

CURRENT STATUS OF THE LAW

Courts have not hesitated to apply equitable tolling to bar the
defendant from relying on the statute of limitations when the defendant has concealed a cause of action from another or prevented the
discovery of such a cause of action.5 9 Statutes of limitations do not
begin to run until the time of injury or from the time when the injury
6
should have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 0
Since the defendant withheld from the plaintiff notice of a cause of
action, it would be inequitable for the defendant to assert that the
plaintiff "sat on his rights."
With respect to statutes of repose there are two distinct timeframes in which there are issues as to whether the principles of
equitable estoppel may come into play. The first time-frame is when
the injury occurs within the repose period, but because of the representations of the would-be defendant, the injured party is "lulled into
a sense of false security" and forgoes the bringing of suit. 61 In
contrast, the second time-frame is when the injury occurs following
the running of the repose period, but because of the defendant's
wrongful conduct it would be inequitable for the defendant to assert
a defense, namely the statute of repose.
A.

SITUATION ONE: INJURY OCCURS WITHIN THE REPOSE PERIOD

Usually, if a product injures the plaintiff within the repose period,
the plaintiff immediately or soon thereafter discovers the ijjury and
suit is brought. There are instances, however, when the injury occurs
within the repose period, but either the injury itself is not discovered
repose period
or the cause of the injury is unknown. Only after the
62
brought.
suit
and
discovered
cause
the
is
has lapsed
59. See, e.g., Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. 231, 232-33 (1959);

Union Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Mowry, 96 U.S. 544 (1877).
The doctrine of equitable estoppel is applied with respect to representations
of a party, to prevent their operating as a fraud upon one who has been led

to rely upon them. They would have that effect, if a party who, by his
statements as to matters of fact, or as to his intended abandonment of
existing rights, had designedly induced another to change his conduct or
alter his condition in reliance upon them, could be permitted to deny the
truth of his statements, or enforce his rights against his declared intention
of abandonment.
Id. at 547-48.
60. See supra note 14.

61. Schroeder v. Young, 161 U.S. 334, 344 (1896); Insurance Co. v. Wilkinson,
80 U.S. 222, 233 (1871).
62. E.g., Groth v. Sandoz, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 453, 454 (D. Neb. 1984)
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Most courts, regardless of the seemingly absolute language of the
statutes of repose, are willing to apply equitable principles when the
injury has occurred within the repose period but, due to the defendant's wrongful misrepresentations, the cause of action has not been
brought until after the statute of repose would bar the action. 63 Similar
to the rationale used when courts allow the equitable tolling of statutes
of limitations, courts generally hold that "the doctrine of equitable
estoppel precludes a defendant from raising the defense of the statute
of ultimate repose where there is evidence of fraud or other conduct
on which the plaintiff reasonably relied in forbearing the bringing of
a lawsuit. '" 64 In either case, the injured party would have brought suit
but for the defendant's conduct. Fairness and equity demand that the
risk of loss be shifted from the innocent plaintiff to the defendant
whose wrongful conduct induced the plaintiff to postpone bringing
suit.
However, some courts refuse to apply the doctrine of equitable
estoppel to statutes of repose in this situation, focusing solely on what
is considered to be the purpose of the statutes - to impose an

(pharmaceutical drugs); Olson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 556 N.E.2d 716,
719 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (asbestos). One case in this category involved a machine
which bore an incorrect nameplate which misrepresented the true manufacturer.
Anane v. Pettibone Corp., 560 N.E.2d 1088, 1089 (Il1. App. Ct. 1990). Most often
the cases in this situation involve the medical or construction statutes of repose since
the injuries or damages in those situations are more readily concealed. See Hill v.
Fordham, 367 S.E.2d 128, 129 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988) (medical malpractice suit against
dentist who allegedly failed to inform patient of impacted tooth); Beals v. Breeden
Bros., 833 P.2d 348, 349 (Or. Ct. App. 1992) (homeowners' suit brought against
land developer for damage done by deposits of expansive clay located beneath
homes).
63. See Bomba v. W.L. Belvidere, Inc., 579 F.2d 1067, 1070 (7th Cir. 1978)
(applying the principles of equitable estoppel notwithstanding the "In no event"
language of the statute of repose); Canton Lutheran Church v. Sovik, Mathre,
Sathrum & Quanbeck, 507 F. Supp. 873, 880 (D.S.D. 1981) (holding architect's and
contractor's fraudulent conduct estopped them from relying on the statute of repose
defense); Hill, 367 S.E.2d at 132 (stating that statute of repose will not insulate
health care provider from fraudulent conduct); Mega v. Holy Cross Hosp., 490
N.E.2d 665, 669 (Ill.
1986) ("[Plrinciples of equitable estoppel may prevent a
defendant from invoking the [statute of repose] as a bar."); Witherell v. Weimer,
515 N.E.2d 68, 73 (Ill. 1987); Gillam v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 489 N.W.2d
289, 293 (Neb. 1992) (holding equitable tolling available when injury occurs within
repose period); MacMillen v. A.H. Robins Co., 348 N.W.2d 869, 871-72 (Neb. 1984)
("[D]efendant's fraudulent conduct may ... estop it from asserting the products
liability statute of [repose].").
64. Hill, 367 S.E.2d at 132 ("The sun never sets on fraud.").
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absolute cutoff date. 65 Such rigid and harsh applications of statutes
of repose would seem to encourage product manufacturers to commit

frauds upon their consumers in the hope that the truth will not be

discovered by the consumers until the repose period has lapsed. Not

only does this approach encourage such wrongful conduct, it rewards
it. By barring the plaintiff's suit, the courts allow the defendant to
profit from its wrongs.
B. SITUATION TWO: INJURY OCCURS AFTER REPOSE PERIOD

In the second situation, on which this comment focuses, the
injury from the product occurs after the repose period, but the
plaintiff alleges that the manufacturer fraudulently concealed information concerning the dangerous attributes of its products from the

plaintiff. 66 During this time-frame, a majority of courts are unwilling
to recognize an exception to the legislatively created statutes of

repose. 67 This refusal is based on the courts' strict interpretation that

statutes of repose were intended to be absolute, and thus, no exceptions apply.
The starting point in interpreting a statute is the plain language

of the statute itself. 6 Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention
65. E.g., Thorton v. Mono Mfg. Co., 425 N.E.2d 522, 527 (I11.App. Ct. 1981);

Beals, 833 P.2d at 350 (The court held that equitable estoppel did not apply to repose
period when damage occurred within the repose period. "[T]o hold otherwise, would
thwart the legislature's intent to provide an absolute cutoff date for bringing such
actions."). In Thorton, the appellate court stated, "where the language of a statute
is certain and unambiguous, the only legitimate function of the courts is to enforce
the law as enacted by the legislature." Thorton, 425 N.E.2d at 527. However, the
Illinois Supreme Court has noted that "the principal of equitable estoppel applies to
the repose period as well as the limitations period." Witherell, 515 N.E.2d at 73;
Mega, 490 N.E.2d at 669. Witherell and Mega both involved the medical malpractice
statute of repose (four years) and cases in which the injury occurred within the repose
period, but suit was not brought until the repose period had lapsed.
66. This argument presumes a duty of manufacturers to recall and warn
consumers of product defects. See supra note 12.
67. Peterson v. Fuller Co., 807 F.2d 151, 153 (8th Cir. 1986); Brown v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 690 F. Supp. 857, 859 (D. Neb. 1988) (estoppel not available in DES
case as the injury was not discovered within the repose period); Groth v. Sandoz,
Inc., 601 F. Supp. 453 (D. Neb. 1984); Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So. 2d 415 .(Fla. 1992).
Although Florida provided a fraud exception to its now-repealed products liability
statute of repose, the medical malpractice statute of repose contained no such
exception. The court dismissed the case noting, "[w]hether public policy supports
such a distinction is a matter for the legislature, not this court, to determine." Id.
at 419-20.
68. See Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102,
108 (1980).
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to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclu-

sive. 69 Most statutes of repose are written in clear, unambiguous

language suggesting the legislatures did not intend for any exceptions
to apply. 70 The legislative history of these statutes seems to support

this reading since the legislatures sought to sever the "long tail" of
liability which manufacturers faced. 71 If read as prescribing an ultimate cut-off of liability, then the usual reasons for tolling the statutes
would not apply, as the focus would be on the age of the product
72
rather than the conduct of the manufacturer.

The following two cases followed this literal application rule. In

Peterson v. Fuller Co., 73 the plaintiff suffered a hearing loss in 1984
and brought suit against the manufacturer of air compressors which
were used below the deck of a barge where he worked. 74 The compressors were sold for use in 1967, seventeen years prior to the alleged
injury. 7 The district court dismissed the case, holding the action was
clearly barred by the ten-year period of repose.76 The plaintiff on

69. Id. The Illinois Supreme Court also recited the age-old rule of statutory
construction that: "We recognize that in construing the Act we must ascertain and
give effect to the legislature's intent in enacting the statute and, accordingly, we look
to the language of the statute itself as the best indication of the intent of the
drafters." Kirwan v. Welch, 549 N.E.2d 348, 349 (Ill. 1989). See Johnson v. Star
Mach. Co., 530 P.2d 53, 57-58 (Or. 1974) (noting that in interpreting statutes, the
legislative intent controls).
70. See, e.g., 735 ILCS 5/13-213(b) (1992). The Illinois statute of repose states:
No product liability action based on the doctrine of strict liability in tort
shall be commenced except within the applicable limitations period and, in
any event, within 12 years from the date of first sale ....
or 10 years from

the date of first sale . . . to its initial user . . . whichever period expires
earlier . ..
Id. (emphasis added). See Scott v. Archer-Daniels-Midland, Co., 551 N.E.2d 776,
777 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (holding that where the language is clear and unambiguous,
the courts must enforce the law as enacted without resort to other aids); Thorton v.
Mono Mfg. Co., 425 N.E.2d 522, 527 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) ("[Wlhere the language
of a statute is certain and unambiguous, the only legitimate function of the courts is
to enforce the law as enacted by the legislature."); Johnson, 530 P.2d at 57 (holding
a court cannot ignore the plain meaning of unambiguous words in a statute).
71. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
72. Raithaus v. Saab-Scandia of Am., Inc., 784 P.2d 1158, 1160-61 (Utah
1989).
73. 807 F.2d 151 (8th Cir. 1986) (applying Nebraska law).
74. Id. at 152.
75. Id.
76. Id. The Nebraska products liability statute of repose requires suit to be
brought within 10 years after the product's initial sale for use. NEB. REV, STAT. § 25224(2) (1989).
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appeal argued that the repose statute was equitably tolled as he alleged
that the manufacturer had fraudulently concealed information regarding the compressor's dangers." The court of appeals refused to apply
the principles of equitable estoppel because the plaintiff's injuries
occurred after the expiration of the ten-year repose period."8

Similarly, in Groth v. Sandoz, Inc.,7 9 suit was brought against a

drug manufacturer for kidney damage allegedly caused by a prescription drug. 0 The plaintiff used the drug from January 1971 until her
injury was diagnosed in February 1981. s1 The plaintiff alleged that
the manufacturer fraudulently misrepresented the drug's effectiveness
and safety. 2 The court granted the defendant's summary judgment
motion and dismissed the cause of action, because the claim was
brought more than ten years following the first sale of the drug. 3
In addition to strictly honoring the legislative intent by applying
the literal application rule, both Peterson and Groth cited the reasoning of Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen14 in reaching their conclusions. 5 In Rosenberg, the plaintiff brought suit against the municipality
and contractors to recover for personal injuries she sustained as a
result of alleged negligence in repaving a public street thirty-four years
earlier.8 6 The court upheld the grant of the defendant's summary
judgment motion based on the ten-year construction statute of repose. 7 The court rejected the plaintiff's contention that the statute
deprived her of due process in that it barred her cause of action
before it accrued. 8 In upholding the statute of repose, the court
concluded that the legislature must have broad latitude and its enactments must be extended a presumption of constitutionality. 9 More
importantly, the court held that a statute of repose does not bar a

77. 807 F.2d at 153.
78. Id. (citing Miers v. Central Mine Equip. Co., 604 F. Supp. 502, 505 (D.
Neb. 1985)) (equitable tolling available when injury occurs within repose period).
79. 601 F. Supp. 453 (D. Neb. 1984).
80. Id. at 454.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.at 456.
84. 293 A.2d 662 (N.J. 1972).
85. Peterson v. Fuller Co., 807 F.2d 151, 153 (8th Cir. 1986); Groth v. Sandoz,
Inc., 601 F. Supp. 453, 455 (D. Neb. 1984).
86. Rosenberg, 293 A.2d at 663.
87. Id. at 668.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 666.
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cause of action, but rather "prevent[s] what might otherwise be a
cause of action from ever arising." 9
Thus, following the reasoning of Rosenberg, injuries which occur
after the repose period do not constitute breaches of any obligation,
since the manufacturer only has an obligation to the consumer within
the statutory period. 9l If the injury occurs after the repose period has
expired, no matter how egregious the misrepresentation or fraudulent
the concealment may be, such conduct can in no way interfere with
the would-be plaintiff's suit since he or she "literally has no cause of
action." ' 92 The injured party could not in any way have been induced
to postpone the filing of suit, because the plaintiff had no cause of
action which could be brought.
IV.

PROPOSAL

In contrast to the statute involved in Peterson and Groth, the
Model Uniform Product Liability Act provides that the statute of
repose "does not apply if the product seller intentionally misrepresents
facts about its product, or fraudulently conceals information about
it, and that conduct was a substantial cause of the claimant's harm." 93
However, most states do not provide this statutory exception.9 In the
absence of a statutory exception, courts should not hesitate to apply
the doctrine of equitable estoppel to prevent a defendant from raising
the statute of repose when the manufacturer knowingly concealed
information concerning the unreasonably dangerous defects of its
90. Id. at 667.

91. Martin, supra note 28, at 749 (discussing the effects of statutes of repose).
92. Rosenberg, 293 A.2d at 667.
93. Model Unif. Prod. Liab. Act §§ 110(A)(1), 110(B)(1), 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714,
62,732 (1979).
94. Some states do provide an exception in instances of fraud. These states
deny the availability of the statute of repose defense in instances where a product
seller intentionally misrepresents its product or fraudulently conceals information
about its product and such misrepresentation or concealment is the proximate cause
of harm. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-577a(d) (West 1991); IDAHO CODE § 61403(2)(b)(2) (1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3303(b)(2)(B) (Supp. 1992).
The Georgia ten-year statute of repose does not apply to actions "arising out of
conduct which manifests a willful, reckless, or wanton disregard for life or property."
GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-11(c) (Michie Supp. 1992). The Georgia statute expressly
notes that the repose statute does not "relieve a manufacturer from the duty to warn
of a danger arising from use of a product once that danger becomes known to the
manufacturer." Id. See also ALA. CODE § 6-5-502(e)(1) (Supp. 1992) and N.D. CENT.
CODE § 28-01.1-02(3) (1991), which both provide for a failure to recall or warn
exception.
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product knowing that such conduct would be relied on by the con-

sumer to his or her detriment. Specifically, there are two reasons why
equity should apply to this second time-frame. First, the reasoning
used in Rosenberg may be semantically correct, however, the duty of
a court of justice is to insure that no fraud is rewarded - regardless

of whether the injury occurs within the repose period or not. Second,
the interests of injured consumers and society greatly outweigh the
interests of manufacturers who engage in wrongful conduct. Further,
this exception would neither "swallow up the rule" nor negate the
policy behind statutes of repose, as the number of claims fitting into
this exception would be relatively small.
A.

ROSENBERG AND THE DUTY OF THE COURTS

Rosenberg held that the effect of a statute of repose is to
extinguish a cause of action at an ascertainable time, regardless of
whether a claim had yet accrued. 95 The Utah Supreme Court, in
deciding the constitutionality of Utah's statute of repose, stated that
the Rosenberg argument begs the question:
The question, in our view, is whether there is a remedy by due
course of law, and that question is not answered by arguing

that a cause of action is not abrogated but is only defined to
be temporally limited. In short, the constitutional protection
cannot be evaded by the semantic argument that a cause of

action is not cut off but only defined to exist for a specified
period of time. 96

Likewise, the courts' duty to insure, to the extent possible, that

justice is done and that no fraud is rewarded cannot be skirted by

95. Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, 293 A.2d 662, 667 (N.J. 1972); see
supra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
96. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 679 (Utah 1985) (emphasis

added). Some detractors have argued that "a claim cannot logically be 'stale' before
it accrues and it should not be cut off before it exists. . .

."

Sun Valley Water Beds

of Utah, Inc. v. Herm Hughes & Son, Inc., 782 P.2d 188, 189 (Utah 1989) (footnotes
omitted); Dincher v. Marlin Firearms Co., 198 F.2d 821, 823 (2d Cir. 1952) (Frank,
J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
Except in topsy-turvy land, you can't die before you are conceived, or be
divorced before ever you marry, or harvest a crop never planted, or burn
down a house never built, or miss a train running on a nonexistent railroad.
For substantially similar reasons, it has always heretofore been accepted, as
a sort of legal 'axiom,' that a statute of limitations does not begin to run
against a cause of action before that cause of action exists, i.e., before a
judicial remedy is available to the plaintiff.
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holding that this duty only exists within the statutory period. The rule

requiring the courts to mechanically apply a statute's unambiguous
language is not so strict as to be without exception. If a literal
application of the statute produces an unreasonable result, "it is the
duty of the court to construe the act, if possible, so that it is a
reasonable and workable law and not inconsistent with the general
policy of the legislature."

97

Indeed, the courts have always, out of

fairness and justice, been disinclined to give one who has engaged in
fraudulent conduct the benefit of the misrepresentation made. 98 It has

been suggested that equitable estoppel applies in instances where a
plain reading of the statute may indicate that no exceptions are
available. 99
The six elements of the doctrine of equitable estoppel' ° can be
harmonized into one basic issue for determining the applicability of
equitable estoppel: whether, under the circumstances, it would be
against good conscience and fair and honest dealing to allow a party
to repudiate the consequences of his representations or conduct.' 0 '
One purpose of the principle of equitable estoppel is to protect a
party who has been lulled into a sense of false security through the

fraudulent representation of another.10 2 Similarly, purchasers of prod-

97. Johnson v. Star Mach. Co., 530 P.2d 53, 58 (Or. 1974) (citing cases).
Although it can be argued that the specific policy of legislatures in passing statutes
of repose was to provide an absolute cut-off date, the better argument is that it is
the general policy of the legislatures and courts to insure that fraudulent and wrongful
acts not be rewarded. E.g., United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289,
326 (1942) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Guy v. Schuldt, 138 N.E.2d 891, 896 (Ind.
1956).
98. See, e.g., Insurance Co. v. Wilkinson, 80 U.S. 222 (1871). The Court
stated:
The principle is that where one party has by his representations or his
conduct induced the other party to a transaction to give him an advantage
which it would be against equity and good conscience for him to assert, he
would not in a court of justice be permitted to avail himself of that
advantage .... [TIhe general doctrine is well understood and is applied by

courts of law as well as equity Where the technical advantage thus obtained
is set up and relied on to defeat the ends of justice .
Id. at 233 (emphasis added).
99. See Bomba v. W.L. Belvidere, Inc., 579 F.2d 1067, 1070 (7th Cir. 1978)
(Equitable estoppel "might apply no matter how unequivocally the applicable limitations period is expressed."); Hecht v. Marsh, 181 N.W. 135, 138 (Neb. 1920)
("[Estoppel] is a principle of equity, superior to any technical or artificial legal rules,
which takes effect whenever the assertion of such a rule would result in perpetrating
or ratifying a fraud.").
100. See supra notes 51-58 and accompanying text.
101. Hecht, 181 N.W. at 138.
102. E.g., Schroeder v. Young, 161 U.S. 334, 344 (1896). The Court pointed
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ucts containing latent defects which are revealed many years following
its sale or manufacture are lulled into a false sense of security believing
that no defects or hazards are present in the product and that the
product is reasonably safe. Having no notice of defects through
manufacturer warnings or recalls, the consumer stands innocently
uninformed of the unreasonably dangerous aspects of the product.
The consumer can be said to reasonably rely in good faith on the
defendant's conduct, here, the manufacturer's silence, which indicates
that the product is not defective or unreasonably dangerous. 03
In addition to extinguishing a cause of action regardless of
whether the injury has yet accrued, products liability statutes of repose
may also have other negative effects. The Utah Supreme Court in
Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,04 suggested that such statutes may be
counterproductive in terms of public safety as they are "likely to
provide less incentive to manufacturers to take adequate safety precautions in the manufacture and design of products having a useful
life of more than [the repose period], thereby increasing the already
substantial number of persons who have been injured or killed by
shoddy design or workmanship." 1 05 It is also possible that statutes of
repose might encourage some manufacturers of defective goods to
withhold warning of their products' unreasonably dangerous attributes
in hope that the repose period will run before many lawsuits are
filed. 106These negative effects of products liability statutes of repose,
the disincentive to take adequate safety precautions and the encouragement to withhold critical information from consumers, necessitate
the application of the principles of equitable estoppel to such enactments when manufacturers use these provisions to shield themselves
from the effects of their own wrongdoing.
out that in "such circumstances the courts have held with great unanimity that the
purchaser is estopped to insist upon the statutory period . .. upon the ground that

the debtor was lulled into a false security." Id.
103. Marcum v. Richmond Auto Parts Co., 270 N.E.2d 884, 888 (Ind. Ct. App.
1971).
[Olne cannot justly or equitably lull his adversary into a false sense of
security, and thereby cause his adversary to subject his claim to the bar of
the statute, and then be permitted to plead the very delay caused by his
course of conduct as a defense to the action when brought.
Id. (citing Howard v. West Jersey & S.S.R. Co., 141 A. 755, 757-58 (N.J. Eq. 1928)).
104. 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985).
105. Id. at 683; see also JEROME MIRZA, ILLINOIS TORT LAW AND PRACTICE 297
(1988) (calling the Illinois construction statute of repose "a license for the negligent
designing and construction of buildings and other structures in our state to the
detriment of the public").
106. See infra note 130.
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In Wilson v. Robertshaw Controls Co., 07 a case similar to the
introductory example of this comment, the plaintiff was injured by a
defective water heater control valve after the repose period had
expired. The manufacturer had intentionally taken active steps to
conceal the defect and the. resulting number of serious injuries and
deaths from consumers, the Consumer Product Safety Commission
and others. The court denied the defendant's summary judgement
motion holding that, "[tihe plaintiffs have alleged more than passive
silence. The record in this case is sufficient to pry open our courthouse
door to permit proof of these allegations to the trier of fact." 10 In
reaching its conclusion that the statute of repose is not a valid defense
in cases where the manufacturer has actively concealed the dangers
inherent in its product from the consumer, the court relied on the
reasoning of Guy v. Schuldt,'09 in which the court held that:
Fraud vitiates anything. Courts will not uphold fraud, or
presume the Legislature intended to do so by allowing one in
a confidential relationship to conceal an injury done another
until the statute of limitations has run. The language of the
statute should be so plain that there is no question as to its
meaning if the Legislature intends to give a wrongdoer the
advantage and benefit of his fraudulent concealment of an
injury done another. Equity had its origin in granting relief
from frauds when the old common law courts were too rigid
in their reasoning to grant relief from grave injustices." 0
B.

PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

The foundation of an argument either for or against the application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel to bar a manufacturer
from asserting the statute of repose as a defense is based on one's
view of liability. From the manufacturers' point of view, there is a
claim for fairness; liability cannot go on indefinitely - at some point,
107. No. S 83-312 (N.D. Ind. June 28, 1984) (denying defendant's summary
judgment motion), mot. denied, 600 F. Supp. 671 (N.D. Ind. 1985) (denying
defendant's motion to dismiss).
108. Id.at 12.
109. 138 N.E.2d 891, 896 (Ind. 1956).
110. Id. (emphasis added). Note that although the Guy court used the term
"statute of limitations," the Wilson court used Guy as authority in holding that
equitable estoppel was applicable to IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-20A-5 (Burns 1983),
Indiana's products liability statute of repose. Wilson, No. S 83-312, slip op. at 10-
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"the right to be free of stale claims . ..comes to prevail over the
right to prosecute them." 11' The injured consumer's position is that

the one who has superior knowledge of the defect and the product's
dangers, who placed the product in the stream of commerce, and who
is in the best position to prevent defects in the product should bear

the loss. Out of fairness and justice, the innocent consumer should
not have to shoulder the entire loss when the injury is caused by a
product's defects - especially when the manufacturer fraudulently
concealed the defects which caused the injury. Society has an interest
in this as well; it wants justice to be done, but recognizes the price

and toll of litigation.
The courts are left in a quandary. On one hand, a basic principle
in our system of jurisprudence - "older than the country itself ' 2
- is that "no man may take advantage of his own wrong.""' On
the other hand, if too many equitable exceptions are made to the
repose provisions, the certainty of these statutes will be lost if their

application is "up for grabs" in every case." 4 In short, there is the
potential that the exception will swallow up the rule." 5
A 1977 Insurance Services Office study indicates that of all capital

goods claims, 21.5%70 involve injuries which occur more than eight
years after the product is manufactured, while 14.007o involve injuries

by products more than twelve years old. 116 However, when capital

goods are not isolated, the survey suggests that a statute of repose of

eight years would bar fewer than four percent of all products liability

claims." 7' Another report indicates that 9707o of bodily injuries occur

111. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 349
(1944). But see Sun Valley Water Beds of Utah, Inc. v. Herm Hughes & Son, Inc.,
782 P.2d 188, 189 (Utah 1989) (noting that a claim cannot logically be stale before
it accrues). See McGovern, supra note 3, at 592-94 (noting that the ultimate issue in
product liability cases is who should bear the loss).
112. Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. 231, 234 (1959).
113. Id. at 232.
114. Olson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 904 F.2d 198, 201 (4th Cir. 1990) (citing English
v. Pabst Brewing Co., 828 F.2d 1047, 1049 (4th Cir. 1987)).
115. Id.
116. INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, PRODUCT LI4I rLrTY CLOSED CLAIM SURVEY: A
TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF SURVEY RESULTS 82 (1977). Although dated, the ISO survey
offers an untainted account of the number of products liability cases brought after
manufacture since it was conducted before most states enacted statutes of repose.
For a discussion of the ISO survey and a general discussion of statutes of repose, see
Martin, supra note 28, at 745-55.
117. INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, PRODUCT LIABILITY CLOSED CLAIM SURVEY: A
TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF SURVEY RESULTS 81 (1977). Further, the actual number of
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within five years of purchase." 8 Thus, a statute of repose would have

little effect on most claims." 9 Yet cases involving older products

generally account for more than their proportionate share of damages

incurred. 20 The reason for this can be attributed to the type of
products involved at different times.' 2' For example, claims involving

disposable consumer goods are usually brought soon after manufacuseful life
ture, while capital goods tend to cause injury later in their
22

and generally have a greater capacity for serious injury.'
Although these figures demonstrate that proportionally, the number of claims which arise after the repose period are few, the injuries
received by would-be plaintiffs are great. 23 Furthermore, one court
' 24 If the claims
has noted that such figures are "double-edged.' 1

brought against manufacturers after the repose period are so few,

then the burden in defending, or insuring against, those claims should

the loss a plaintiff might suffer as a
be slight when weighed against
25
result of a product defect.1
Of the four percent of all claims which are brought after eight
years, it is probably safe to assume that the majority did not involve
claims of intentional misrepresentation or fraudulent concealment.
Thus, the number of cases which would be eligible for consideration
of this proposed exception would be relatively small. Further, in order
to restrict that number, a high standard should be required for the
plaintiffs to meet. In order for the principles of equitable estoppel to
apply, the courts should insist on more than passive silence or
tort cases filed in' 1989 was 447,374 - less than half of one percent of all cases filed

in state courts. Roxanne Barton Conlin, 'LitigationExplosion:' Tempest in a Teapot?,

TRIAL, Nov. 1991, at 114. The author noted that of that small percentage, such
routine litigation as auto accidents is included. Id. After labeling the litigation
explosion as a myth, Chicago attorney Philip H. Corboy noted that 18 million new
civil suits are filed each year. However, "more than 97% of those are divorces and
custody cases, wills and probate contests, contract and real estate disputes, and even
small claims cases." Philip H. Corboy, Corboy Disputes Quayle's ABA Arguments
About 'Litigation Explosion', Cm.DAILY L. BULL., Aug. 30, 1991, at 2 ("Plaintiffs
filed 16,166 product liability suits in federal courts in [1990]. Of these, 10,715
involved a single product: asbestos.").
118. INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 26, at VII-20.
119. VANDALL, supra note 23, at 163.
120. Martin, supra note 28, at 755.

121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.

124. Sun Valley Water Beds of Utah, Inc. v. Herm Hughes & Son, Inc., 782
P.2d 188, 190 (Utah 1989).
125. Id.
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negligent representations on the part of the manufacturer. The standard should be one of intentional or fraudulent concealment of
material information regarding the product's latent dangerous attributes and such concealment must be the proximate cause of the
resulting harm. The manufacturer must engage in some type of willful
and wanton conduct, purposely seeking to defraud consumers and
lull them into a sense of false security knowing that in doing so, the
potential of death or serious injury is great. 26 In applying such a
standard, the courts will not nullify the legislative attempt to protect
manufacturers from perpetual liability, but will take reasonable steps
to protect the legitimate rights of consumers whose injuries could
have been avoided had the manufacturer not engaged in such wrongful
27

conduct. 1

To illustrate how the doctrine of equitable estoppel would be
applied to the facts of a products liability suit, the introductory
example regarding the defective water heater control valve (the Wilson
case) can again be utilized. The facts of Wilson satisfied the six
elements of the doctrine of equitable estoppel. 2s First, there was
conduct by the manufacturer amounting to a misrepresentation or
concealment of material facts. Although equitable estoppel requires a
misrepresentation or concealment, silence, where there exists a legal
duty to speak is sufficient. 29 Here, however, the defendant engaged
in an active concealment under circumstances where the manufacturer
owed a duty to warn the plaintiff or otherwise recall its defective
product. 3 0 Additionally, the defendant manufacturer violated the
126. Miers v. Central Mine Equip. Co., 604 F. Supp. 502, 507-08 (D. Neb.
1985) (holding that the plaintiff must prove more than a misrepresentation or failure
to warn under an equitable estoppel theory). There must be some element of moral
turpitude connected with the silence or inaction by which the other party is misled
as to his injury. 28 AM. JUR. 2D Estoppel and Waiver § 53, at 667 (1966).
127. One purpose of strict liability is to place the liability on the party who
stands in the position of cheapest cost-avoider. See supra note 23 and accompanying
text.
128. See supra notes 51-58 and accompanying text listing the elements of
equitable estoppel.
129. See Milligan v. Miller 97 N.E. 1054, 1057 (Ill. 1912) ("Estoppel may arise
from silence .

.

. where there is a duty to speak, and the party on whom the duty

rests has an opportunity to speak and, knowing the circumstances, keeps silent.");
Bodine v. Bodine, 489 N.E.2d 911, 913 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) ("Silence may constitute
conduct inducing detrimental reliance if there is a duty to speak."); 28 AM. JUR. 2D
Estoppel and Waiver § 53, at 665 (1966) ("The authorities make it abundantly clear
that an estoppel may arise under certain circumstances from silence or inaction as
well as from words or actions.").
130. A plaintiff in a similar case expanded on the actions of the defendant taken
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regulations promulgated pursuant to the Consumer Product Safety
Act by its false and misleading reporting of the true nature and extent
of the hazard, including the number of deaths and serious injuries
which resulted from its product's defects. This conduct would be
sufficient under this comment's proposed exception as the manufacturer took affirmative and calculated steps to defraud the consuming
public.
Second, the defendant had knowledge that its representations
were untrue. Third, the plaintiff was unaware of the unreasonably

dangerous condition of the water heater control valve and the dangers
inherent in his continued use and operation thereof by reason of the
concealment practiced upon him by the defendant. Fourth, the manufacturer intended or reasonably expected that its conduct would be
relied upon by the plaintiff. The manufacturer knew that without
recalling the product or warning of its dangers, consumers would
continue to use the defective control. Fifth, the plaintiff can be said
to have relied upon the defendant's misrepresentations to his detriment. It was entirely reasonable for the consumer, who was unaware
of the dangers inherent in the continued use of the defendant's
product, to believe that the product would safely operate for the

purposes for which it was designed. Sixth, the plaintiff would be

prejudiced if the manufacturer was permitted to deny the truth of the
misrepresentation by asserting the statute of repose. Therefore, be-

cause of the control valve manufacturer's wrongful and fraudulent

actions, it should be equitably estopped from relying on the statute
of repose.

in regards to the defective water heater control valve:
[Flor a number of years prior to decedent's death defendant was aware its
control valve was defective and represented a real danger to the public (there
had apparently been more than 100 accidents resulting in 32 deaths and 77
injuries), yet it did not recall the controls nor attempt to alert the public to
the risk, but embarked instead upon an affirmative course of conduct
designed and calculated to conceal the problems with the control. Allegedly
this concealment, which continued for several years after decedent's death,
was undertaken with the intention of deceiving the public at large as to the
continued fitness for use of this control valve which defendant had placed
in commerce and minimizing recoveries in lawsuits generated by the faulty
control.
Young v. Robertshaw Controls Co., 481 N.Y.S.2d 891, 893-94 (N.Y. App. Div.
1984) (emphasis added). See Cover v. Cohen, 461 N.E.2d 864, 871 (N.Y. 1984)
("Although a product be reasonably safe when manufactured and sold and involve
no known risks of which warning need be given, risks thereafter revealed by user
operation and brought to the attention of the manufacturer or vendor may impose
upon one or both a duty to warn.").
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CONCLUSION

Assuming there is a significant long-tail problem facing manufacturers and the rationale behind statutes of repose is reasonable,
the courts should not permit manufacturers who have fraudulently
concealed defects from consumers to raise statutes of repose as a
defense. To do so would reward those companies for concealing their
products' dangers beyond the repose period. This is the very situation
the doctrine of equitable estoppel is intended to prevent.' 3 ' Is it
possible that the legislatures intended that manufacturers who are
"successful" in hiding a product's defect for the repose period be
rewarded by extinguishing all claims against them? To the contrary,
the legislatures and the courts have always been careful to never
reward fraud.

32

The function of tort law will likely be frustrated where manufacturers know that liability for their products, known to be unreasonably
dangerous or defective, will end on a set date. These manufacturers
will have a strong incentive to conceal such defects from their consumers with the hope that few claims will arise and the defects will
not be discovered before the statutory period ends. By passing statutes
of repose, the legislatures have, in reality, created a situation where
manufacturers are encouraged to defraud their consumers.' 33 It is the
duty of the courts to insure that such fraud will not be rewarded.
Justice Frankfurter in United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.'3 4 asked,
"[I]s there any principle which is more familiar or more firmly
embedded in the history of Anglo-American law than the basic
doctrine that the courts will not permit themselves to be used as
35
instruments of inequity and injustice?"'
MARK W. PEACOCK

131. See Wichita Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Jones, 130 P.2d 556, 559 (Kan.
1942) ("The proper function of 'equitable estoppel' is the prevention of fraud, actual
or constructive, and the doctrine should always be so applied as to promote the ends
of justice and accomplish that which ought to be done between man and man.").
132. E.g., United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 326 (1942)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Guy v. Schuldt, 138 N.E.2d 891, 896 (Ind. 1956).
133. See Hill v. Fordham, 367 S.E.2d 128 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988). In a medical
malpractice suit against a dentist who allegedly concealed the plaintiff's true condition, the court stated: "The statute of ultimate repose should not provide an incentive
for a doctor or other medical professional to conceal his or her negligence with the
assurance that after five years such fraudulent conduct will insulate him or her from
liability. The sun never sets on fraud." Id. at 131-32 (emphasis added).
134. 315 U.S. 289 (1942).
135. Id. at 326 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).

